From ca1e0f3cce8a40f97ab3364030a22fbd9e663d33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Frederick Lawler Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2026 15:34:58 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 1/4] integrity: Report error code in integrity_audit_msg() call sites integrity_audit_msg() hides error codes by wrapping integrity_audit_message() which obfuscates the underlying reason for the failure. Update integrity_audit_msg() to take a errno argument, and pass that through to integrity_audit_message(). Then update call sites to take caller's respective error codes. ima_appraise_measurement() stores xattr_len as the return code, but can replace it with a error code later. Therefore conditionally use a code if rc < 0, otherwise report zero. Lastly, conditionally use -EINVAL for ima_release_policy(). Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler Reviewed-by: Enrico Bravi Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 9 +++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 ++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 +++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 7 ++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 7 ++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 11 ++++++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 2 +- security/integrity/integrity.h | 5 +++-- security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 5 +++-- 11 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index b59e3f121b8a..5be9349afcd0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, dentry->d_inode, dentry->d_name.name, "update_metadata", integrity_status_msg[evm_status], - -EPERM, 0); + -EPERM, 0, -EPERM); } out: /* Exception if the HMAC is not going to be calculated. */ @@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ out: integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", integrity_status_msg[evm_status], - -EPERM, 0); + -EPERM, 0, -EPERM); return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM; } @@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ static int evm_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", integrity_status_msg[evm_status], - -EPERM, 0); + -EPERM, 0, -EPERM); return -EPERM; } @@ -992,7 +992,8 @@ static int evm_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, d_backing_inode(dentry), dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata", - integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0); + integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0, + -EPERM); return -EPERM; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index 122d127e108d..f765bfe5db68 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, if (result < 0) { integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, template_name, op, - audit_cause, result, 0); + audit_cause, result, 0, result); return result; } } @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, ima_free_template_entry(entry); err_out: integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename, - op, cause, result, 0); + op, cause, result, 0, result); } /** @@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ out: integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename.name.name, "collect_data", - audit_cause, result, 0); + audit_cause, result, 0, result); release_dentry_name_snapshot(&filename); } @@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template_desc); if (result < 0) { integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename, - op, audit_cause, result, 0); + op, audit_cause, result, 0, result); return; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index b280488e15fc..84c4dee2323c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -564,7 +564,7 @@ out: status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; cause = "unverifiable-signature"; integrity_audit_msg(audit_msgno, inode, filename, - op, cause, rc, 0); + op, cause, rc, 0, rc < 0 ? rc : 0); } else if (status != INTEGRITY_PASS) { /* Fix mode, but don't replace file signatures. */ if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIX) && !try_modsig && @@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ out: } integrity_audit_msg(audit_msgno, inode, filename, - op, cause, rc, 0); + op, cause, rc, 0, rc < 0 ? rc : 0); } else { ima_cache_flags(iint, func); } @@ -752,7 +752,7 @@ static int validate_hash_algo(struct dentry *dentry, path = NULL; integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, d_inode(dentry), path, - "set_data", errmsg, -EACCES, 0); + "set_data", errmsg, -EACCES, 0, -EACCES); kfree(pathbuf); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 2a0bca554316..3b8174a91a34 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -592,11 +592,11 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (data[0] == '/') { result = ima_read_policy(data); } else if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY) { + result = -EACCES; pr_err("signed policy file (specified as an absolute pathname) required\n"); integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, "policy_update", "signed policy required", - 1, 0); - result = -EACCES; + result, 0, result); } else { ima_measure_raw_policy(data, datalen); result = ima_parse_add_rule(data); @@ -745,7 +745,8 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) pr_info("policy update %s\n", cause); integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, - "policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0); + "policy_update", cause, !valid_policy, 0, + !valid_policy ? -EINVAL : 0); if (!valid_policy) { ima_delete_rules(); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index d53f4d89a53e..7a76e2686267 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) return 0; err_out: integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, filename, op, - audit_cause, result, 0); + audit_cause, result, 0, result); return result; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index ab1e53b3210d..9e80f40680d7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ static int mmap_violation_check(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file, *pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, filename); integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, *pathname, - "mmap_file", "mmapped_writers", rc, 0); + "mmap_file", "mmapped_writers", rc, 0, rc); } return rc; } @@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, file_inode(file), pathname, "collect_data", - "denied-hash-algorithm", rc, 0); + "denied-hash-algorithm", rc, 0, rc); } out_locked: if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags) && @@ -579,7 +579,8 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, file = vma->vm_file; pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename); integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, pathname, - "collect_data", "failed-mprotect", result, 0); + "collect_data", "failed-mprotect", result, 0, + result); if (pathbuf) __putname(pathbuf); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 68d9a5e6c232..9013c962dc0b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -1992,7 +1992,8 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) entry = kzalloc_obj(*entry); if (!entry) { integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, - NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info); + NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info, + -ENOMEM); return -ENOMEM; } @@ -2003,7 +2004,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule) ima_free_rule(entry); integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result, - audit_info); + audit_info, result); return result; } @@ -2421,7 +2422,7 @@ void ima_measure_loaded_policy(void) rule = kmalloc(rule_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!rule) { integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, event_name, - op, "ENOMEM", result, 0); + op, "ENOMEM", result, 0, result); return; } @@ -2440,7 +2441,7 @@ void ima_measure_loaded_policy(void) result = -E2BIG; integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, event_name, op, "rule_length", - result, 0); + result, 0, result); rcu_read_unlock(); goto free_rule; } @@ -2454,7 +2455,7 @@ void ima_measure_loaded_policy(void) file.buf = kmalloc(file_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!file.buf) { integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, event_name, - op, "ENOMEM", result, 0); + op, "ENOMEM", result, 0, result); goto free_rule; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c index 0f1b7e4113c4..67782c004cdf 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation, out: mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex); integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename, - op, audit_cause, result, audit_info); + op, audit_cause, result, audit_info, result); return result; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index 8a89236f926c..9bd80ca1159a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, if (result) { integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, event_data->filename, "collect_data", - "failed", result, 0); + "failed", result, 0, result); return result; } cur_digest = hash_hdr->digest; diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 0c581c03c5da..2ab6b7e34e7e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -218,7 +218,8 @@ static inline void evm_load_x509(void) /* declarations */ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, - const char *cause, int result, int info); + const char *cause, int result, int info, + int errno); void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, @@ -235,7 +236,7 @@ integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type) static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, const char *cause, - int result, int info) + int result, int info, int errno) { } diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c index d8d9e5ff1cd2..2dd2d7e3916e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c +++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c @@ -27,10 +27,11 @@ __setup("integrity_audit=", integrity_audit_setup); void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, - const char *cause, int result, int audit_info) + const char *cause, int result, int audit_info, + int errno) { integrity_audit_message(audit_msgno, inode, fname, op, cause, - result, audit_info, 0); + result, audit_info, errno); } void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, From 1dc317438308c79cf90a6f14d3e4116347ea3716 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Frederick Lawler Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2026 15:34:59 -0500 Subject: [PATCH 2/4] integrity: Replace integrity_audit_message() with integrity_audit_msg() Now that integrity_audit_msg() accepts an errno parameter, it is equivalent to integrity_audit_message(). Replace the remaining integrity_audit_message() call sites with integrity_audit_msg() and remove integrity_audit_message(). Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 +++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 8 ++++---- security/integrity/integrity.h | 13 ------------- security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 9 --------- 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 9e80f40680d7..bd9997b01633 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -1196,9 +1196,9 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, out: if (ret < 0) - integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, eventname, - func_measure_str(func), - audit_cause, ret, 0, ret); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, eventname, + func_measure_str(func), + audit_cause, ret, 0, ret); return ret; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c index b5ed33cbb272..8adc8863ad5a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c @@ -90,10 +90,10 @@ static struct ima_key_entry *ima_alloc_key_entry(struct key *keyring, out: if (rc) { - integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, - keyring->description, - func_measure_str(KEY_CHECK), - audit_cause, rc, 0, rc); + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, + keyring->description, + func_measure_str(KEY_CHECK), + audit_cause, rc, 0, rc); ima_free_key_entry(entry); entry = NULL; } diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 2ab6b7e34e7e..52c5ec881cca 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -221,11 +221,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, const char *cause, int result, int info, int errno); -void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, - const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, - const char *cause, int result, int info, - int errno); - static inline struct audit_buffer * integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type) { @@ -240,14 +235,6 @@ static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, { } -static inline void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, - struct inode *inode, - const unsigned char *fname, - const char *op, const char *cause, - int result, int info, int errno) -{ -} - static inline struct audit_buffer * integrity_audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, int type) { diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c index 2dd2d7e3916e..22106aaeb0df 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c +++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c @@ -29,15 +29,6 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, const char *cause, int result, int audit_info, int errno) -{ - integrity_audit_message(audit_msgno, inode, fname, op, cause, - result, audit_info, errno); -} - -void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, - const unsigned char *fname, const char *op, - const char *cause, int result, int audit_info, - int errno) { struct audit_buffer *ab; char name[TASK_COMM_LEN]; From e8386a3360adb6ec327def1557d2c0fd62c49386 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Enrico Bravi Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2026 16:46:45 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 3/4] ima: recover number of violations after kexec When recovering the IMA measurement list after kexec(), currently, the counter of violations is not restored. This causes a mismatch between the real number of violations and the value reported by the /ima/violations file. Restore the violations counter during the IMA measurement list recovery. This mechanism does not take into account false positives. A legit all-zeros hash is treated as a violation. Reported-by: Roberto Sassu Closes: https://github.com/linux-integrity/linux/issues/13 Signed-off-by: Enrico Bravi Reviewed-and-tested-by: Roberto Sassu [zohar@linux.ibm.com: Fixed patch description line length] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c index 7034573fb41e..daa897ccaf58 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c @@ -524,6 +524,13 @@ int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t size, void *buf) ret = -EINVAL; break; } + } else { + /* + * If the template hash found in the kexec buffer is all + * zeros, record it as a violation. Note that this can + * be a false positive. + */ + atomic_long_inc(&ima_num_violations); } entry->pcr = !ima_canonical_fmt ? *(u32 *)(hdr[HDR_PCR].data) : From ceb24c7052cc4649e3b52a51a7cca7dfe4896cec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fabrice Derepas Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2026 16:18:40 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 4/4] ima: reject a kexec buffer whose declared size exceeds the buffer ima_restore_measurement_list() parses the measurement list persisted across kexec. It computes the parse end directly from the blob: bufendp = buf + khdr->buffer_size; khdr->buffer_size is a u64 read straight from the persisted buffer. The only length checks in the function are size >= sizeof(*khdr), version == 1 and count -- none relates buffer_size to size, the actual buffer size the caller (ima_load_kexec_buffer()) obtained from the ima-kexec-buffer region. ima_parse_buf() bounds every field read to bufendp, so a blob whose internal buffer_size exceeds the real size makes the parse loop read past the end of the buffer (CWE-125). The buffer's memory range is validated against addressable RAM by commit cbf9c4b9617b ("of: check previous kernel's ima-kexec-buffer against memory bounds") and commit c5489d04337b ("x86/kexec: add a sanity check on previous kernel's ima kexec buffer"), but the blob's own declared size is never clamped to it. Reject a buffer_size larger than size before the loop. This is on the boot-time kexec-restore path (__init) and the buffer comes from the previous kernel, so triggering it requires control of the persisted buffer; it is an out-of-bounds read only. Fixes: 94c3aac567a9 ("ima: on soft reboot, restore the measurement list") Assisted-by: copilot-cli:claude-opus-4-6 frama-c Signed-off-by: Fabrice Derepas Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c index daa897ccaf58..16154078fd70 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c @@ -450,6 +450,11 @@ int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t size, void *buf) return -EINVAL; } + if (khdr->buffer_size > size) { + pr_err("attempting to restore a corrupted measurement list"); + return -EINVAL; + } + bitmap_zero(hdr_mask, HDR__LAST); bitmap_set(hdr_mask, HDR_PCR, 1); bitmap_set(hdr_mask, HDR_DIGEST, 1);