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An AMT Request has an unauthenticated, spoofable source address. Allocating tunnel state from that path allowed spoofed Requests to consume tunnel slots or overwrite the nonce and MAC of an established gateway. Keep Requests stateless by deriving the Query MAC from the source address, source port, nonce, and current secret, and retain four secret generations so a gateway can renew its MAC across rotations. Authenticate the Membership Update before decapsulation, and create or refresh tunnel state only once ip_mc_check_igmp() or ipv6_mc_check_mld() has accepted the encapsulated message. Key verified state by the address/port endpoint, enforce global and per-source limits, and silently reject an endpoint that cannot be admitted: withhold the Query rather than send ICMP Host Unreachable to a source address nothing has authenticated yet. A MAC is now accepted only for a bounded time after the Query that carried it. Before, a tunnel copied the secret when a Request created it and never saw it rotate, so its MAC never expired. Now the secret rotates every 60 seconds and four generations are kept, so a MAC is accepted for 180 to 240 seconds. RFC 7450 section 5.2.3.5.4 has a gateway start a query timer when it accepts a Query, with a duration it SHOULD compute from the Query's QQIC (125 seconds here), and section 5.2.3.5.5 has it send a new Request when that timer expires, so a gateway that times its next Request from QQIC renews its MAC inside the window. The in-tree gateway re-Requests every two seconds while its Requests are answered. A gateway that never sends another Request kept working before; now its Updates are dropped as Invalid MAC once the window has passed. So is the first Update after a new join from a gateway that, as section 5.2.3.5.4 also allows, uses a longer timer while it has no group subscriptions to report: it is dropped until that gateway's next Request. Which MACs are accepted changes too. Before, an Update had to carry the nonce and MAC of the latest Request from its address; now any pair minted for its address and port within the window is accepted. The MAC never covered the encapsulated report, so this changes only how long a pair seen by an on-path observer stays usable: off-path senders still cannot produce a valid pair. The secret is now seeded before amt_socket_create() enables the receive path. It was seeded after the socket was created since commitb9022b53ad("amt: add control plane of amt interface"), when there was no receive path yet, and commitcbc21dc1cf("amt: add data plane of amt interface") added amt_rcv() and the per-tunnel copy of the key without moving it. Since then a Request that arrived during amt_dev_open() could get a tunnel whose MAC used an all-zero key (on the first open) or the previous key for the tunnel's whole life. amt_update_tunnel() retries once when it finds its tunnel dead, and the lookup skips dead tunnels, so an Update that races amt_tunnel_expire() creates the replacement instead of being dropped. The Request path's per-source count and the re-check under amt->lock in amt_tunnel_get_or_create() skip them too. Every tunnel is now created by an Update, which stamps last_seen, so amt_tunnel_expire() no longer treats a last_seen of 0 as never refreshed. amt_tunnel_get_or_create() also rechecks netif_running() under amt->lock before it links a tunnel. dev_close() clears the running state before it calls amt_dev_stop(), which drains the list under amt->lock, so an Update still being received while the device goes down cannot link a tunnel after the drain. Every Membership Update, forged ones included, reads the secret generations to check its MAC. Their writers hold amt->lock and update them inside a seqcount, amt->key_seq. The Update path copies them in a key_seq read loop, so reading them takes amt->lock only on PREEMPT_RT, to wait for a writer. Keying by address and port lets one address hold several tunnels; before this patch the Request path looked tunnels up by address alone, so an address normally held only one. amt_max_tunnels_per_src() bounds that at an eighth of max_tunnels, at least one tunnel and at most AMT_MAX_TUNNELS_PER_SRC (16): 16 at the default 128 slots, 2 at 16. One address then holds at most an eighth of a table of eight or more slots, while gateways behind NAT still get several tunnels once the table has 16 or more slots. A configurable limit needs new uAPI, so it is left for net-next. Found by code inspection against RFC 7450; not triggered at runtime. The Sashiko AI review of an earlier posting pointed out the undocumented behaviour changes and that a fixed per-source cap let one address fill a small table. Fixes:cbc21dc1cf("amt: add data plane of amt interface") Signed-off-by: Omar Ramadan <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>