Files
linux/kernel/panic.c
T
Linus Torvalds 7d1f84f1b9 Merge tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2026-10-25-14-57' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:

 - "ocfs2: exit recovery thread on mount error path" (Joseph Qi):

   Stop OCFS2 recovery before freeing failed-mount state and replay
   slots, closing use-after-free and double-free races. Defer
   suballocator reclaim to break a transaction-lock deadlock with
   dismount.

 - "ocfs2: validate suballoc slot and bit of metadata blocks" (Joseph
   Qi):

   Validate OCFS2 metadata suballocator slots, bits and directory index
   block locations. Reject corrupt metadata with filesystem errors
   instead of BUGs or out-of-bounds accesses.

 - "ocfs2: deal with legacy signed name hash values" (Joseph Qi):

   Restore OCFS2 lookups for non-ASCII names stored with legacy signed
   hashes. Use stored xattr hashes during bucket splits to avoid
   duplicate entries and spurious ENOSPC failures.

 - "ocfs2: stabilize dentry names in file and setattr traces" (Cen
   Zhang):

   Snapshot OCFS2 names during file and setattr tracing to prevent
   rename races using freed storage or mismatched names and lengths.
   Preserve trace formats and the locked release open-count sample.

 - "panic: fix panic_force_cpu= redirect races and NMI bypass" (Bradley
   Morgan):

   Fix panic_force_cpu races and NMI redirection so crash-kernel CPU
   selection is honored. Preserve variable arguments on failed redirects
   and use a static message buffer.

 - "fat: allocate multiple clusters in fallocate" (Matheus Alves de
   Almeida):

   Allocate FAT clusters in batches for FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE and batch
   FAT updates. This removes repeated single-cluster allocation
   overhead, particularly on synchronous mounts.

 - "scripts/gdb: fix radix tree lookup and stack depot diagnostic"
   (Ting-Han Hou):

   Fix GDB radix-tree lookup and its handling of XArray sibling, retry
   and zero entries. Also repair the stack-depot diagnostic for an
   out-of-range pool index.

 - "hung_task: Improve warning budget handling and task reporting"
   (Aaron Tomlin):

   Reset the hung-task warning budget after recovery so later hangs
   remain visible. Keep the configured limit intact and emit one summary
   per scan when detailed reports exhaust the budget.

 - "bootconfig: Reject unexpected data after null character and
   cleanups" (Masami Hiramatsu):

   Reject bootconfig data after an embedded null while accepting
   trailing padding. Validate the full input in the userspace tool, and
   retain internal tree sanity checks there rather than in the kernel.

 - "kbuild: GCOV cleanups following the prefer-atomic fix" (Konstantin
   Khorenko):

   Use the actual GCOV build flags in the prefer-atomic compiler probe.
   Move flag setup into scripts/Makefile.gcov and skip the probe when
   GCOV is disabled.

 - "ocfs2: xattr bucket validation fixes" (Joseph Qi):

   Accept valid OCFS2 xattr buckets spanning 512-byte blocks, avoiding
   false read-only remounts. Reject misaligned buckets and return errors
   instead of panicking on corrupt defrag metadata.

 - "ocfs2: fix metadata reservation for xattr value trees" (Joseph Qi):

   Reserve enough OCFS2 metadata for new and relocated xattr value
   trees. Fix shortfalls which could cause ENOSPC, dropped entries and
   leaked clusters on fragmented filesystems; remove duplicate
   reservations.

 - "Introduce arch_do_panic" (Mete Durlu):

   Add arch_do_panic() and move s390 and sparc handling out of generic
   panic code. The architecture-specific actions now follow the
   end-of-panic marker.

 - "checkpatch: userspace improvements" (Petr Vorel):

   Improve checkpatch's userspace detection and suppress kernel-only
   checks. Recognize standard inttypes macros and add explicit
   --userspace and --no-userspace overrides.

 - "ocfs2: validate dr_fs_generation of dir index root blocks" (Joseph
   Qi):

   Check OCFS2 directory index generations and leaf block numbers.
   Reject stale or misplaced blocks instead of using metadata left by a
   previously formatted filesystem.

 - "selftests/membarrier: Skip an unregistered memory barrier test on
   Musl" (Chris Gellermann):

   Skip the unregistered membarrier test when libc has already
   registered the command. Musl does this during thread creation,
   causing false failures in the multithreaded test.

 - "init: fix array boundary bugs in boot parameter parsing"
   (Wilson Felipe Pereira):

   Fix boot argument boundary cases which leave stale arguments in
   init's command line or panic when replacing the final environment
   variable. Clear the last slot and check duplicates before the limit.

Summary of the 87 singletons in this merge:

  The OCFS2 singletons fix deadlocks between xattr updates and inline
  truncation, and during inode reclaim. Corrupt quota and extent
  metadata could also crash the kernel or corrupt memory; these paths
  now check the layout before using it. Other fixes close use-after-free
  and publication races around cluster reconfiguration, node failure,
  quota remount errors and shared refcount trees. New files now retain
  security labels from all stacked LSMs instead of silently dropping all
  but one. Valid xattr insertions also stop tripping FORTIFY on builds
  with counted arrays.

  Elsewhere, a lost wakeup could leave hardware-monitoring reads stuck
  in unkillable sleep and block further I2C traffic. That is fixed, as
  are kernel memory leaks in POSIX message-queue notifications and tmpfs
  casefold setup which could grow until memory is exhausted. A driver
  removal race which could crash the kernel is fixed too. The
  hibernation command through reboot() also stops taking the same mutex
  twice, avoiding a deadlock before suspension.

  On the boot side, bzip2 decoding now accepts valid full blocks emitted
  by lbzip2, fixing failures to boot those compressed kernels. Malformed
  bzip2 streams can no longer overflow the decode buffer, and LZ4
  initrds are checked before the decoder can read past their end. FAT
  rejects geometry which overflows the data-area calculation on 32-bit
  systems, and rolls back entries when inode setup fails, preventing
  failed creations from reappearing after remount. The x86 XOR and RAID6
  AVX paths also avoid imposing a slowdown on subsequent SSE code.

* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2026-10-25-14-57' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (134 commits)
  scripts/gdb: fix stack depot out-of-bounds diagnostic
  scripts/gdb: fix radix tree lookup pointer handling
  ocfs2/cluster: remove zero-address nodes from IP tree on teardown
  ocfs2: snapshot the dentry name while tracing file release
  ocfs2: snapshot dentry names in file and setattr traces
  ocfs2/dlm: drain join handlers before releasing module text
  MAINTAINERS: update Markus's e-mail address
  mailmap: add entries for Andrew Jones
  stackdepot: stop preallocating after the final pool
  ocfs2: drain quorum work before removing the cluster
  watchdog: force console verbose when reporting lockups
  profiling: fix sampling step on 64-bit big-endian systems
  kernel/reboot: avoid potential deadlocks during suspension
  compat: avoid double rounding in times()
  ocfs2: pin owning modules for open debugfs files
  ocfs2/cluster: initialize heartbeat regions before publishing them
  selftests/proc: proc-pid-vm: fix unused variable warning on non-x86
  ocfs2: pin refcount trees before dropping the lookup lock
  ocfs2: validate the xattr tree root of an indexed xattr block
  ocfs2/dlm: hold the lookup reference across convert AST enqueue
  ...
2026-10-27 12:08:22 -10:00

1271 lines
32 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* linux/kernel/panic.c
*
* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds
*/
/*
* This function is used through-out the kernel (including mm and fs)
* to indicate a major problem.
*/
#include <linux/debug_locks.h>
#include <linux/sched/debug.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/kgdb.h>
#include <linux/kmsg_dump.h>
#include <linux/kallsyms.h>
#include <linux/notifier.h>
#include <linux/vt_kern.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/ftrace.h>
#include <linux/reboot.h>
#include <linux/delay.h>
#include <linux/kexec.h>
#include <linux/panic_notifier.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
#include <linux/sysrq.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/nmi.h>
#include <linux/console.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
#include <linux/sysfs.h>
#include <linux/context_tracking.h>
#include <linux/seq_buf.h>
#include <linux/sys_info.h>
#include <trace/events/error_report.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <kunit/test-bug.h>
#define PANIC_TIMER_STEP 100
#define PANIC_BLINK_SPD 18
#define PANIC_MSG_BUFSZ 1024
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
* Should we dump all CPUs backtraces in an oops event?
* Defaults to 0, can be changed via sysctl.
*/
static unsigned int __read_mostly sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace;
#else
#define sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace 0
#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
int panic_on_oops = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS);
static unsigned long tainted_mask =
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDSTRUCT) ? (1 << TAINT_RANDSTRUCT) : 0;
static int pause_on_oops;
static int pause_on_oops_flag;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pause_on_oops_lock);
bool crash_kexec_post_notifiers;
int panic_on_warn __read_mostly;
unsigned long panic_on_taint;
bool panic_on_taint_nousertaint = false;
static unsigned int warn_limit __read_mostly;
static bool panic_console_replay;
bool panic_triggering_all_cpu_backtrace;
static bool panic_this_cpu_backtrace_printed;
int panic_timeout = CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(panic_timeout);
unsigned long panic_print;
static int panic_force_cpu = -1;
ATOMIC_NOTIFIER_HEAD(panic_notifier_list);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_notifier_list);
static void panic_print_deprecated(void)
{
pr_info_once("Kernel: The 'panic_print' parameter is now deprecated. Please use 'panic_sys_info' and 'panic_console_replay' instead.\n");
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
/*
* Taint values can only be increased
* This means we can safely use a temporary.
*/
static int proc_taint(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct ctl_table t;
unsigned long tmptaint = get_taint();
int err;
if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
t = *table;
t.data = &tmptaint;
err = proc_doulongvec_minmax(&t, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (write) {
int i;
/*
* If we are relying on panic_on_taint not producing
* false positives due to userspace input, bail out
* before setting the requested taint flags.
*/
if (panic_on_taint_nousertaint && (tmptaint & panic_on_taint))
return -EINVAL;
/*
* Poor man's atomic or. Not worth adding a primitive
* to everyone's atomic.h for this
*/
for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++)
if ((1UL << i) & tmptaint)
add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
return err;
}
static int sysctl_panic_print_handler(const struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
if (write)
panic_print_deprecated();
return proc_doulongvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}
static const struct ctl_table kern_panic_table[] = {
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
{
.procname = "oops_all_cpu_backtrace",
.data = &sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
#endif
{
.procname = "tainted",
.maxlen = sizeof(long),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_taint,
},
{
.procname = "panic",
.data = &panic_timeout,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "panic_on_oops",
.data = &panic_on_oops,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "panic_print",
.data = &panic_print,
.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned long),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = sysctl_panic_print_handler,
},
{
.procname = "panic_on_warn",
.data = &panic_on_warn,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
.extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
.extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
},
{
.procname = "warn_limit",
.data = &warn_limit,
.maxlen = sizeof(warn_limit),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_douintvec,
},
#if (defined(CONFIG_X86_32) || defined(CONFIG_PARISC)) && \
defined(CONFIG_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW)
{
.procname = "panic_on_stackoverflow",
.data = &sysctl_panic_on_stackoverflow,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
#endif
{
.procname = "panic_sys_info",
.data = &panic_print,
.maxlen = sizeof(panic_print),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = sysctl_sys_info_handler,
},
};
static __init int kernel_panic_sysctls_init(void)
{
register_sysctl_init("kernel", kern_panic_table);
return 0;
}
late_initcall(kernel_panic_sysctls_init);
#endif
/* The format is "panic_sys_info=tasks,mem,locks,ftrace,..." */
static int __init setup_panic_sys_info(char *buf)
{
/* There is no risk of race in kernel boot phase */
panic_print = sys_info_parse_param(buf);
return 1;
}
__setup("panic_sys_info=", setup_panic_sys_info);
static atomic_t warn_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
static ssize_t warn_count_show(struct kobject *kobj, struct kobj_attribute *attr,
char *page)
{
return sysfs_emit(page, "%d\n", atomic_read(&warn_count));
}
static struct kobj_attribute warn_count_attr = __ATTR_RO(warn_count);
static __init int kernel_panic_sysfs_init(void)
{
sysfs_add_file_to_group(kernel_kobj, &warn_count_attr.attr, NULL);
return 0;
}
late_initcall(kernel_panic_sysfs_init);
#endif
static long no_blink(int state)
{
return 0;
}
/* Returns how long it waited in ms */
long (*panic_blink)(int state);
EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_blink);
/*
* Stop ourself in panic -- architecture code may override this
*/
void __weak __noreturn panic_smp_self_stop(void)
{
while (1)
cpu_relax();
}
/*
* Stop ourselves in NMI context if another CPU has already panicked. Arch code
* may override this to prepare for crash dumping, e.g. save regs info.
*/
void __weak __noreturn nmi_panic_self_stop(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
panic_smp_self_stop();
}
/*
* Stop other CPUs in panic. Architecture dependent code may override this
* with more suitable version. For example, if the architecture supports
* crash dump, it should save registers of each stopped CPU and disable
* per-CPU features such as virtualization extensions.
*/
void __weak crash_smp_send_stop(void)
{
static int cpus_stopped;
/*
* This function can be called twice in panic path, but obviously
* we execute this only once.
*/
if (cpus_stopped)
return;
/*
* Note smp_send_stop is the usual smp shutdown function, which
* unfortunately means it may not be hardened to work in a panic
* situation.
*/
smp_send_stop();
cpus_stopped = 1;
}
atomic_t panic_cpu = ATOMIC_INIT(PANIC_CPU_INVALID);
atomic_t panic_redirect_cpu = ATOMIC_INIT(PANIC_CPU_INVALID);
#if defined(CONFIG_SMP) && defined(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP)
static char panic_force_buf[PANIC_MSG_BUFSZ];
static int __init panic_force_cpu_setup(char *str)
{
int cpu;
if (!str)
return -EINVAL;
if (kstrtoint(str, 0, &cpu) || cpu < 0 || cpu >= nr_cpu_ids) {
pr_warn("panic_force_cpu: invalid value '%s'\n", str);
return -EINVAL;
}
panic_force_cpu = cpu;
return 0;
}
early_param("panic_force_cpu", panic_force_cpu_setup);
static void do_panic_on_target_cpu(void *info)
{
panic("%s", (char *)info);
}
/**
* panic_smp_redirect_cpu - Redirect panic to target CPU
* @target_cpu: CPU that should handle the panic
* @msg: formatted panic message
*
* Default implementation uses IPI. Architectures with NMI support
* can override this for more reliable delivery.
*
* Return: 0 on success, negative errno on failure
*/
int __weak panic_smp_redirect_cpu(int target_cpu, void *msg)
{
static call_single_data_t panic_csd;
panic_csd.func = do_panic_on_target_cpu;
panic_csd.info = msg;
return smp_call_function_single_async(target_cpu, &panic_csd);
}
/**
* panic_try_force_cpu - Redirect panic to a specific CPU for crash kernel
* @fmt: panic message format string
* @args: arguments for format string
*
* Some platforms require panic handling to occur on a specific CPU
* for the crash kernel to function correctly. This function redirects
* panic handling to the CPU specified via the panic_force_cpu= boot parameter.
*
* Returns true when this CPU must stop: the panic was redirected or is
* already running on another CPU.
* Returns false when panic() should proceed on this CPU.
*/
__printf(1, 0)
static bool panic_try_force_cpu(const char *fmt, va_list args)
{
int this_cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
int old_cpu = PANIC_CPU_INVALID;
va_list ap;
/* Feature not enabled via boot parameter */
if (panic_force_cpu < 0)
return false;
/* Already on target CPU - proceed normally */
if (this_cpu == panic_force_cpu)
return false;
/* Target CPU is offline, can't redirect */
if (!cpu_online(panic_force_cpu)) {
pr_warn("panic: target CPU %d is offline, continuing on CPU %d\n",
panic_force_cpu, this_cpu);
return false;
}
/*
* Don't redirect when a panic is already in progress. Stop this
* CPU when it's another one, proceed when it's this one.
*/
if (panic_in_progress())
return panic_on_other_cpu();
/*
* Only one CPU can do the redirection. Others should go offline.
* Continue with panic() when we already tried the redirection
* from this CPU before, for example via nmi_panic().
*/
if (!atomic_try_cmpxchg(&panic_redirect_cpu, &old_cpu, this_cpu))
return old_cpu != this_cpu;
/*
* Do not consume args, the caller reuses them if we fail.
*/
va_copy(ap, args);
vsnprintf(panic_force_buf, PANIC_MSG_BUFSZ, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
console_verbose();
bust_spinlocks(1);
pr_emerg("panic: Redirecting from CPU %d to CPU %d for crash kernel.\n",
this_cpu, panic_force_cpu);
/* Dump original CPU before redirecting */
if (!test_taint(TAINT_DIE) &&
oops_in_progress <= 1 &&
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE)) {
dump_stack();
}
if (panic_smp_redirect_cpu(panic_force_cpu, panic_force_buf) != 0) {
atomic_set(&panic_redirect_cpu, PANIC_CPU_INVALID);
pr_warn("panic: failed to redirect to CPU %d, continuing on CPU %d\n",
panic_force_cpu, this_cpu);
return false;
}
/* IPI/NMI sent, this CPU should stop */
return true;
}
#else
__printf(1, 0)
static inline bool panic_try_force_cpu(const char *fmt, va_list args)
{
return false;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_SMP && CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP */
bool panic_try_start(void)
{
int old_cpu, this_cpu;
/*
* Only one CPU is allowed to execute the crash_kexec() code as with
* panic(). Otherwise parallel calls of panic() and crash_kexec()
* may stop each other. To exclude them, we use panic_cpu here too.
*/
old_cpu = PANIC_CPU_INVALID;
this_cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
return atomic_try_cmpxchg(&panic_cpu, &old_cpu, this_cpu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_try_start);
void panic_reset(void)
{
atomic_set(&panic_cpu, PANIC_CPU_INVALID);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_reset);
bool panic_in_progress(void)
{
return unlikely(atomic_read(&panic_cpu) != PANIC_CPU_INVALID);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_in_progress);
/* Return true if a panic is in progress on the current CPU. */
bool panic_on_this_cpu(void)
{
/*
* We can use raw_smp_processor_id() here because it is impossible for
* the task to be migrated to the panic_cpu, or away from it. If
* panic_cpu has already been set, and we're not currently executing on
* that CPU, then we never will be.
*/
return unlikely(atomic_read(&panic_cpu) == raw_smp_processor_id());
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_on_this_cpu);
/*
* Return true if a panic is in progress on a remote CPU.
*
* On true, the local CPU should immediately release any printing resources
* that may be needed by the panic CPU.
*/
bool panic_on_other_cpu(void)
{
return (panic_in_progress() && !panic_on_this_cpu());
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic_on_other_cpu);
/*
* A variant of panic() called from NMI context. The panic is first
* redirected to the CPU requested via panic_force_cpu=, when configured.
* We return if we've already panicked on this CPU. If another CPU already
* panicked, loop in nmi_panic_self_stop() which can provide architecture
* dependent code for saving register state for crash dump.
*/
void nmi_panic(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
/* Try to redirect to the requested CPU before claiming panic_cpu. */
if (panic_try_force_cpu(fmt, args)) {
/*
* Mark ourselves offline so panic_other_cpus_shutdown() won't
* wait for us on architectures that check num_online_cpus().
*/
set_cpu_online(raw_smp_processor_id(), false);
nmi_panic_self_stop(regs);
}
if (panic_try_start())
vpanic(fmt, args);
if (panic_on_other_cpu())
nmi_panic_self_stop(regs);
va_end(args);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(nmi_panic);
void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin)
{
unsigned int limit;
if (panic_on_warn)
panic("%s: panic_on_warn set ...\n", origin);
limit = READ_ONCE(warn_limit);
if (atomic_inc_return(&warn_count) >= limit && limit)
panic("%s: system warned too often (kernel.warn_limit is %d)",
origin, limit);
}
static void panic_trigger_all_cpu_backtrace(void)
{
/* Temporary allow non-panic CPUs to write their backtraces. */
panic_triggering_all_cpu_backtrace = true;
if (panic_this_cpu_backtrace_printed)
trigger_allbutcpu_cpu_backtrace(raw_smp_processor_id());
else
trigger_all_cpu_backtrace();
panic_triggering_all_cpu_backtrace = false;
}
/*
* Helper that triggers the NMI backtrace (if set in panic_print)
* and then performs the secondary CPUs shutdown - we cannot have
* the NMI backtrace after the CPUs are off!
*/
static void panic_other_cpus_shutdown(bool crash_kexec)
{
if (panic_print & SYS_INFO_ALL_BT)
panic_trigger_all_cpu_backtrace();
/*
* Note that smp_send_stop() is the usual SMP shutdown function,
* which unfortunately may not be hardened to work in a panic
* situation. If we want to do crash dump after notifier calls
* and kmsg_dump, we will need architecture dependent extra
* bits in addition to stopping other CPUs, hence we rely on
* crash_smp_send_stop() for that.
*/
if (!crash_kexec)
smp_send_stop();
else
crash_smp_send_stop();
}
void __weak arch_do_panic(void) {}
/**
* vpanic - halt the system
* @fmt: The text string to print
* @args: Arguments for the format string
*
* Display a message, then perform cleanups. This function never returns.
*/
void vpanic(const char *fmt, va_list args)
{
static char buf[PANIC_MSG_BUFSZ];
long i, i_next = 0, len;
int state = 0;
bool _crash_kexec_post_notifiers = crash_kexec_post_notifiers;
if (panic_on_warn) {
/*
* This thread may hit another WARN() in the panic path.
* Resetting this prevents additional WARN() from panicking the
* system on this thread. Other threads are blocked by the
* panic_mutex in panic().
*/
panic_on_warn = 0;
}
/*
* Disable local interrupts. This will prevent panic_smp_self_stop
* from deadlocking the first cpu that invokes the panic, since
* there is nothing to prevent an interrupt handler (that runs
* after setting panic_cpu) from invoking panic() again.
*/
local_irq_disable();
preempt_disable_notrace();
/* Redirect panic to target CPU if configured via panic_force_cpu=. */
if (panic_try_force_cpu(fmt, args)) {
/*
* Mark ourselves offline so panic_other_cpus_shutdown() won't wait
* for us on architectures that check num_online_cpus().
*/
set_cpu_online(smp_processor_id(), false);
panic_smp_self_stop();
}
/*
* It's possible to come here directly from a panic-assertion and
* not have preempt disabled. Some functions called from here want
* preempt to be disabled. No point enabling it later though...
*
* Only one CPU is allowed to execute the panic code from here. For
* multiple parallel invocations of panic, all other CPUs either
* stop themself or will wait until they are stopped by the 1st CPU
* with smp_send_stop().
*
* cmpxchg success means this is the 1st CPU which comes here,
* so go ahead.
* `old_cpu == this_cpu' means we came from nmi_panic() which sets
* panic_cpu to this CPU. In this case, this is also the 1st CPU.
*/
/* atomic_try_cmpxchg updates old_cpu on failure */
if (panic_try_start()) {
/* go ahead */
} else if (panic_on_other_cpu())
panic_smp_self_stop();
console_verbose();
bust_spinlocks(1);
len = vscnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
if (len && buf[len - 1] == '\n')
buf[len - 1] = '\0';
pr_emerg("Kernel panic - not syncing: %s\n", buf);
/*
* Avoid nested stack-dumping if a panic occurs during oops processing
*/
if (atomic_read(&panic_redirect_cpu) != PANIC_CPU_INVALID &&
panic_force_cpu == raw_smp_processor_id()) {
pr_emerg("panic: Redirected from CPU %d, skipping stack dump.\n",
atomic_read(&panic_redirect_cpu));
} else if (test_taint(TAINT_DIE) || oops_in_progress > 1) {
panic_this_cpu_backtrace_printed = true;
} else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE)) {
dump_stack();
panic_this_cpu_backtrace_printed = true;
}
/*
* If kgdb is enabled, give it a chance to run before we stop all
* the other CPUs or else we won't be able to debug processes left
* running on them.
*/
kgdb_panic(buf);
/*
* If we have crashed and we have a crash kernel loaded let it handle
* everything else.
* If we want to run this after calling panic_notifiers, pass
* the "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" option to the kernel.
*
* Bypass the panic_cpu check and call __crash_kexec directly.
*/
if (!_crash_kexec_post_notifiers)
__crash_kexec(NULL);
panic_other_cpus_shutdown(_crash_kexec_post_notifiers);
printk_legacy_allow_panic_sync();
/*
* Run any panic handlers, including those that might need to
* add information to the kmsg dump output.
*/
atomic_notifier_call_chain(&panic_notifier_list, 0, buf);
sys_info(panic_print);
kmsg_dump_desc(KMSG_DUMP_PANIC, buf);
/*
* If you doubt kdump always works fine in any situation,
* "crash_kexec_post_notifiers" offers you a chance to run
* panic_notifiers and dumping kmsg before kdump.
* Note: since some panic_notifiers can make crashed kernel
* more unstable, it can increase risks of the kdump failure too.
*
* Bypass the panic_cpu check and call __crash_kexec directly.
*/
if (_crash_kexec_post_notifiers)
__crash_kexec(NULL);
console_unblank();
/*
* We may have ended up stopping the CPU holding the lock (in
* smp_send_stop()) while still having some valuable data in the console
* buffer. Try to acquire the lock then release it regardless of the
* result. The release will also print the buffers out. Locks debug
* should be disabled to avoid reporting bad unlock balance when
* panic() is not being callled from OOPS.
*/
debug_locks_off();
console_flush_on_panic(CONSOLE_FLUSH_PENDING);
if ((panic_print & SYS_INFO_PANIC_CONSOLE_REPLAY) ||
panic_console_replay)
console_flush_on_panic(CONSOLE_REPLAY_ALL);
if (!panic_blink)
panic_blink = no_blink;
if (panic_timeout > 0) {
/*
* Delay timeout seconds before rebooting the machine.
* We can't use the "normal" timers since we just panicked.
*/
pr_emerg("Rebooting in %d seconds..\n", panic_timeout);
for (i = 0; i < panic_timeout * 1000; i += PANIC_TIMER_STEP) {
touch_nmi_watchdog();
if (i >= i_next) {
i += panic_blink(state ^= 1);
i_next = i + 3600 / PANIC_BLINK_SPD;
}
mdelay(PANIC_TIMER_STEP);
}
}
if (panic_timeout != 0) {
/*
* This will not be a clean reboot, with everything
* shutting down. But if there is a chance of
* rebooting the system it will be rebooted.
*/
if (panic_reboot_mode != REBOOT_UNDEFINED)
reboot_mode = panic_reboot_mode;
emergency_restart();
}
pr_emerg("---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: %s ]---\n", buf);
arch_do_panic();
/* Do not scroll important messages printed above */
suppress_printk = 1;
/*
* The final messages may not have been printed if in a context that
* defers printing (such as NMI) and irq_work is not available.
* Explicitly flush the kernel log buffer one last time.
*/
console_flush_on_panic(CONSOLE_FLUSH_PENDING);
nbcon_atomic_flush_unsafe();
local_irq_enable();
for (i = 0; ; i += PANIC_TIMER_STEP) {
touch_softlockup_watchdog();
if (i >= i_next) {
i += panic_blink(state ^= 1);
i_next = i + 3600 / PANIC_BLINK_SPD;
}
mdelay(PANIC_TIMER_STEP);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(vpanic);
/* Identical to vpanic(), except it takes variadic arguments instead of va_list */
void panic(const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
vpanic(fmt, args);
va_end(args);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic);
#define TAINT_FLAG(taint, _c_true, _c_false) \
[ TAINT_##taint ] = { \
.c_true = _c_true, .c_false = _c_false, \
.desc = #taint, \
}
/*
* NOTE: if you modify the taint_flags or TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT,
* please also modify tools/debugging/kernel-chktaint and
* Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst, including its
* small shell script that prints the TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT bits of
* /proc/sys/kernel/tainted.
*
* Also, update INIT_TAINT_BUF_MAX below.
*/
const struct taint_flag taint_flags[TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT] = {
TAINT_FLAG(PROPRIETARY_MODULE, 'P', 'G'),
TAINT_FLAG(FORCED_MODULE, 'F', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, 'S', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(FORCED_RMMOD, 'R', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(MACHINE_CHECK, 'M', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(BAD_PAGE, 'B', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(USER, 'U', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(DIE, 'D', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE, 'A', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(WARN, 'W', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(CRAP, 'C', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, 'I', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(OOT_MODULE, 'O', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(UNSIGNED_MODULE, 'E', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(SOFTLOCKUP, 'L', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(LIVEPATCH, 'K', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(AUX, 'X', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(RANDSTRUCT, 'T', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(TEST, 'N', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(FWCTL, 'J', ' '),
TAINT_FLAG(FORCED_BIND, 'Y', ' '),
};
#undef TAINT_FLAG
static void print_tainted_seq(struct seq_buf *s, bool verbose)
{
const char *sep = "";
int i;
if (!tainted_mask) {
seq_buf_puts(s, "Not tainted");
return;
}
seq_buf_printf(s, "Tainted: ");
for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++) {
const struct taint_flag *t = &taint_flags[i];
bool is_set = test_bit(i, &tainted_mask);
char c = is_set ? t->c_true : t->c_false;
if (verbose) {
if (is_set) {
seq_buf_printf(s, "%s[%c]=%s", sep, c, t->desc);
sep = ", ";
}
} else {
seq_buf_putc(s, c);
}
}
}
/* The initial buffer can accommodate all taint flags in verbose
* mode, with some headroom. Once the allocator is available, the
* exact size is allocated dynamically; the initial buffer remains
* as a fallback if allocation fails.
*
* The verbose taint string currently requires up to 344 characters.
*/
#define INIT_TAINT_BUF_MAX 370
static char init_taint_buf[INIT_TAINT_BUF_MAX] __initdata;
static char *taint_buf __refdata = init_taint_buf;
static size_t taint_buf_size = INIT_TAINT_BUF_MAX;
static __init int alloc_taint_buf(void)
{
int i;
char *buf;
size_t size = 0;
size += sizeof("Tainted: ") - 1;
for (i = 0; i < TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT; i++) {
size += 2; /* For ", " */
size += 4; /* For "[%c]=" */
size += strlen(taint_flags[i].desc);
}
size += 1; /* For NULL terminator */
buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf) {
panic("Failed to allocate taint string buffer");
}
taint_buf = buf;
taint_buf_size = size;
return 0;
}
postcore_initcall(alloc_taint_buf);
static const char *_print_tainted(bool verbose)
{
struct seq_buf s;
BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(taint_flags) != TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT);
seq_buf_init(&s, taint_buf, taint_buf_size);
print_tainted_seq(&s, verbose);
return seq_buf_str(&s);
}
/**
* print_tainted - return a string to represent the kernel taint state.
*
* For individual taint flag meanings, see Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
*
* The string is overwritten by the next call to print_tainted(),
* but is always NULL terminated.
*/
const char *print_tainted(void)
{
return _print_tainted(false);
}
/**
* print_tainted_verbose - A more verbose version of print_tainted()
*/
const char *print_tainted_verbose(void)
{
return _print_tainted(true);
}
int test_taint(unsigned flag)
{
return test_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(test_taint);
unsigned long get_taint(void)
{
return tainted_mask;
}
/**
* add_taint: add a taint flag if not already set.
* @flag: one of the TAINT_* constants.
* @lockdep_ok: whether lock debugging is still OK.
*
* If something bad has gone wrong, you'll want
* @lockdep_ok = LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE, but for some
* noteworthy-but-not-corrupting cases, it can be set to LOCKDEP_STILL_OK.
*/
void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok)
{
if (lockdep_ok == LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE && __debug_locks_off())
pr_warn("Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n");
set_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
if (tainted_mask & panic_on_taint) {
panic_on_taint = 0;
panic("panic_on_taint set ...");
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_taint);
static void spin_msec(int msecs)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < msecs; i++) {
touch_nmi_watchdog();
mdelay(1);
}
}
/*
* It just happens that oops_enter() and oops_exit() are identically
* implemented...
*/
static void do_oops_enter_exit(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
static int spin_counter;
if (!pause_on_oops)
return;
spin_lock_irqsave(&pause_on_oops_lock, flags);
if (pause_on_oops_flag == 0) {
/* This CPU may now print the oops message */
pause_on_oops_flag = 1;
} else {
/* We need to stall this CPU */
if (!spin_counter) {
/* This CPU gets to do the counting */
spin_counter = pause_on_oops;
do {
spin_unlock(&pause_on_oops_lock);
spin_msec(MSEC_PER_SEC);
spin_lock(&pause_on_oops_lock);
} while (--spin_counter);
pause_on_oops_flag = 0;
} else {
/* This CPU waits for a different one */
while (spin_counter) {
spin_unlock(&pause_on_oops_lock);
spin_msec(1);
spin_lock(&pause_on_oops_lock);
}
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pause_on_oops_lock, flags);
}
/*
* Return true if the calling CPU is allowed to print oops-related info.
* This is a bit racy..
*/
bool oops_may_print(void)
{
return pause_on_oops_flag == 0;
}
/*
* Called when the architecture enters its oops handler, before it prints
* anything. If this is the first CPU to oops, and it's oopsing the first
* time then let it proceed.
*
* This is all enabled by the pause_on_oops kernel boot option. We do all
* this to ensure that oopses don't scroll off the screen. It has the
* side-effect of preventing later-oopsing CPUs from mucking up the display,
* too.
*
* It turns out that the CPU which is allowed to print ends up pausing for
* the right duration, whereas all the other CPUs pause for twice as long:
* once in oops_enter(), once in oops_exit().
*/
void oops_enter(void)
{
nbcon_cpu_emergency_enter();
tracing_off();
/* can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore: */
debug_locks_off();
do_oops_enter_exit();
if (sysctl_oops_all_cpu_backtrace)
trigger_all_cpu_backtrace();
}
static void print_oops_end_marker(void)
{
pr_warn("---[ end trace %016llx ]---\n", 0ULL);
}
/*
* Called when the architecture exits its oops handler, after printing
* everything.
*/
void oops_exit(void)
{
do_oops_enter_exit();
print_oops_end_marker();
nbcon_cpu_emergency_exit();
kmsg_dump(KMSG_DUMP_OOPS);
}
struct warn_args {
const char *fmt;
va_list args;
};
void __warn(const char *file, int line, void *caller, unsigned taint,
struct pt_regs *regs, struct warn_args *args)
{
nbcon_cpu_emergency_enter();
disable_trace_on_warning();
if (file) {
pr_warn("WARNING: %s:%d at %pS, CPU#%d: %s/%d\n",
file, line, caller,
raw_smp_processor_id(), current->comm, current->pid);
} else {
pr_warn("WARNING: at %pS, CPU#%d: %s/%d\n",
caller,
raw_smp_processor_id(), current->comm, current->pid);
}
#pragma GCC diagnostic push
#ifndef __clang__
#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wsuggest-attribute=format"
#endif
if (args)
vprintk(args->fmt, args->args);
#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
print_modules();
if (regs)
show_regs(regs);
check_panic_on_warn("kernel");
if (!regs)
dump_stack();
print_irqtrace_events(current);
print_oops_end_marker();
trace_error_report_end(ERROR_DETECTOR_WARN, (unsigned long)caller);
/* Just a warning, don't kill lockdep. */
add_taint(taint, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
nbcon_cpu_emergency_exit();
}
#ifdef CONFIG_BUG
#ifndef __WARN_FLAGS
void warn_slowpath_fmt(const char *file, int line, unsigned taint,
const char *fmt, ...)
{
bool rcu = warn_rcu_enter();
struct warn_args args;
if (kunit_is_suppressed_warning(true)) {
warn_rcu_exit(rcu);
return;
}
pr_warn(CUT_HERE);
if (!fmt) {
__warn(file, line, __builtin_return_address(0), taint,
NULL, NULL);
warn_rcu_exit(rcu);
return;
}
args.fmt = fmt;
va_start(args.args, fmt);
__warn(file, line, __builtin_return_address(0), taint, NULL, &args);
va_end(args.args);
warn_rcu_exit(rcu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(warn_slowpath_fmt);
#else
void __warn_printk(const char *fmt, ...)
{
bool rcu = warn_rcu_enter();
va_list args;
if (kunit_is_suppressed_warning(false)) {
warn_rcu_exit(rcu);
return;
}
pr_warn(CUT_HERE);
va_start(args, fmt);
vprintk(fmt, args);
va_end(args);
warn_rcu_exit(rcu);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__warn_printk);
#endif
/* Support resetting WARN*_ONCE state */
static int clear_warn_once_set(void *data, u64 val)
{
generic_bug_clear_once();
memset(__start_once, 0, __end_once - __start_once);
return 0;
}
DEFINE_DEBUGFS_ATTRIBUTE(clear_warn_once_fops, NULL, clear_warn_once_set,
"%lld\n");
static __init int register_warn_debugfs(void)
{
/* Don't care about failure */
debugfs_create_file_unsafe("clear_warn_once", 0200, NULL, NULL,
&clear_warn_once_fops);
return 0;
}
device_initcall(register_warn_debugfs);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR
/*
* Called when gcc's -fstack-protector feature is used, and
* gcc detects corruption of the on-stack canary value
*/
__visible noinstr void __stack_chk_fail(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
instrumentation_begin();
flags = user_access_save();
panic("stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: %pB",
__builtin_return_address(0));
user_access_restore(flags);
instrumentation_end();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__stack_chk_fail);
#endif
core_param(panic, panic_timeout, int, 0644);
core_param(pause_on_oops, pause_on_oops, int, 0644);
core_param(panic_on_warn, panic_on_warn, int, 0644);
core_param(crash_kexec_post_notifiers, crash_kexec_post_notifiers, bool, 0644);
core_param(panic_console_replay, panic_console_replay, bool, 0644);
static int panic_print_set(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
panic_print_deprecated();
return param_set_ulong(val, kp);
}
static const struct kernel_param_ops panic_print_ops = {
.set = panic_print_set,
.get = param_get_ulong,
};
__core_param_cb(panic_print, &panic_print_ops, &panic_print, 0644);
static int __init oops_setup(char *s)
{
if (!s)
return -EINVAL;
if (!strcmp(s, "panic"))
panic_on_oops = 1;
return 0;
}
early_param("oops", oops_setup);
static int __init panic_on_taint_setup(char *s)
{
char *taint_str;
if (!s)
return -EINVAL;
taint_str = strsep(&s, ",");
if (kstrtoul(taint_str, 16, &panic_on_taint))
return -EINVAL;
/* make sure panic_on_taint doesn't hold out-of-range TAINT flags */
panic_on_taint &= TAINT_FLAGS_MAX;
if (!panic_on_taint)
return -EINVAL;
if (s && !strcmp(s, "nousertaint"))
panic_on_taint_nousertaint = true;
pr_info("panic_on_taint: bitmask=0x%lx nousertaint_mode=%s\n",
panic_on_taint, str_enabled_disabled(panic_on_taint_nousertaint));
return 0;
}
early_param("panic_on_taint", panic_on_taint_setup);