ieee802154: require CAP_NET_ADMIN for SIOCSIFADDR

PF_IEEE802154 DGRAM sockets are available to ordinary init-net processes.
Their family-specific SIOCSIFADDR path calls the netdev ioctl directly and
does not pass through the generic network-device setter capability check.
An unprivileged process can therefore change the PAN ID and short address
of a separately administrator-owned down WPAN interface.

In a local fakelb fixture, uid 1000 changed both identifiers and the values
remained active through a later administrator interface open in three of
three fresh KASAN boots.

Require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the socket network namespace before processing
SIOCSIFADDR. Keep SIOCGIFADDR and all existing state and value checks
unchanged.

The fixed kernel rejected the same unprivileged request with -EPERM and
preserved the administrator identity in three of three matched boots.
Administrator SET, running-device, invalid-value, wrong-device, cleanup,
later-open and recovery controls passed in all baseline and fixed runs.

The demonstrated impact is local cross-principal WPAN identity and policy
modification after privileged device setup. Memory corruption, disclosure,
RCE and LPE were not demonstrated.

Fixes: 9ec7671603 ("net: add IEEE 802.15.4 socket family implementation")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Sung Byeongchan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Miquel Raynal <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
Sung Byeongchan
2026-11-17 15:53:12 -08:00
committed by Jakub Kicinski
parent 5e9b2ad9b8
commit a0abc1e4c9
+4
View File
@@ -128,6 +128,10 @@ static int ieee802154_dev_ioctl(struct sock *sk, struct ifreq __user *arg,
int ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
struct net_device *dev;
if (cmd == SIOCSIFADDR &&
!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (get_user_ifreq(&ifr, NULL, arg))
return -EFAULT;