Merge tag 'tpm-v7.4-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd

Pull TPM fixes from Jarkko Sakkinen:

 - Add the missing check of the return value of crypto_kpp_set_secret()
   when creating an authenticated HMAC session

 - Check the payload size of EVENT_TAG entries before reading them, in
   order to avoid out-of-bounds reads with a truncated TPM 1.x event log

 - Flush the timeout work outside buffer_mutex in tpm_common_read(), as
   the work itself takes the same mutex, which can lead to a deadlock

 - Fix a memory leak of the event log buffer in the error path of
   tpm_read_log_acpi()

* tag 'tpm-v7.4-rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
  tpm: acpi: Fix memory leak at tpm_read_log_acpi() error path
  tpm: flush timeout work outside buffer_mutex to avoid deadlock
  tpm: eventlog: check the payload size before reading tag events
  tpm: Check return value of crypto_kpp_set_secret()
This commit is contained in:
Linus Torvalds
2026-11-12 09:31:11 -08:00
4 changed files with 22 additions and 5 deletions
+1 -3
View File
@@ -167,10 +167,8 @@ int tpm_read_log_acpi(struct tpm_chip *chip)
}
ret = devm_add_action(&chip->dev, tpm_bios_log_free, log->bios_event_log);
if (ret) {
log->bios_event_log = NULL;
if (ret)
goto err;
}
return format;
+7
View File
@@ -178,6 +178,10 @@ static int get_event_name(char *dest, struct tcpa_event *event,
}
break;
case EVENT_TAG:
if (do_endian_conversion(event->event_size) <
sizeof(pc_event->event_id))
break;
pc_event = (struct tcpa_pc_event *)event_entry;
/* ToDo Row data -> Base64 */
@@ -203,6 +207,9 @@ static int get_event_name(char *dest, struct tcpa_event *event,
name = tcpa_pc_event_id_strings[do_endian_conversion
(pc_event->event_id)];
n_len = strlen(name);
if (do_endian_conversion(event->event_size) <
sizeof(struct tcpa_pc_event) + 20)
break;
for (i = 0; i < 20; i++)
d_len += sprintf(&data[2*i], "%02x",
pc_event->event_data[i]);
+11 -1
View File
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ ssize_t tpm_common_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
{
struct file_priv *priv = file->private_data;
ssize_t ret_size = 0;
bool flush = false;
int rc;
if (!size)
@@ -164,9 +165,18 @@ out:
if (!priv->response_length) {
*off = 0;
timer_delete_sync(&priv->user_read_timer);
flush_work(&priv->timeout_work);
flush = true;
}
mutex_unlock(&priv->buffer_mutex);
/*
* tpm_timeout_work() takes buffer_mutex, so flush it after dropping
* the mutex to avoid a deadlock; the timer is deleted above, so no new
* timeout work can be queued once the mutex is released.
*/
if (flush)
flush_work(&priv->timeout_work);
return ret_size;
}
+3 -1
View File
@@ -527,7 +527,9 @@ static int tpm_buf_append_salt(struct tpm_buf *buf, struct tpm_chip *chip,
}
crypto_ecdh_encode_key(encoded_key, buf_len, &p);
/* this generates a random private key */
crypto_kpp_set_secret(kpp, encoded_key, buf_len);
rc = crypto_kpp_set_secret(kpp, encoded_key, buf_len);
if (rc)
goto err_free_kpp;
/* salt is now the public point of this private key */
req = kpp_request_alloc(kpp, GFP_KERNEL);