KEYS: Protect pkey method checks against type removal

keyctl_pkey_query(), keyctl_pkey_e_d_s() and keyctl_pkey_verify() check
that key->type has the ->asym_*() method they need and call it later,
without holding key->sem.  A reference keeps the key alive, but does not
pin the module that provides its type.

When that module is unloaded, unregister_key_type() waits for the key GC
to process every remaining key of the type.  For each such key, the GC
takes key->sem for writing, switches key->type to key_type_dead, whose
->asym_*() methods are NULL, and destroys the payload.  If that happens
between the check and the call, the keyctl calls a NULL method; if it
happens while the method runs, the method returns into freed module text.
In-tree, turris-signing-key provides ->asym_query() and ->asym_eds_op()
and can be built as a module.

Take key->sem for reading around each method call, and check the method
again under it, right before the call.  While the lock is held the GC
cannot switch the key to key_type_dead, so unregister_key_type() and the
module unload cannot complete until the method returns.  If the type is
already gone, the check finds key_type_dead and the keyctl fails with
-EOPNOTSUPP, as it does for any key type without the method.

memdup_user() and copy_to_user() stay outside key->sem, as in
keyctl_read_key(), so no page fault is taken with key->sem held.  The
in-tree ->asym_*() methods do not take key->sem themselves.  Nothing else
in the kernel calls these methods, so these four call sites are the full
coverage:

 - keyctl_pkey_query(): ->asym_query() for KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY
 - keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(): ->asym_query(), and the op-specific check
   for KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT, _DECRYPT, _SIGN and _VERIFY
 - keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(): ->asym_eds_op() for _ENCRYPT, _DECRYPT and _SIGN
 - keyctl_pkey_verify(): ->asym_verify_signature() for _VERIFY

This problem was recently fixed for keyctl_read_key() by 925c84e3cc
("keys: Protect the read method check against type removal") and for
key_update() by aef3a8a4f988 ("KEYS: Protect the update method check
against type removal").

Fixes: 00d60fd3b9 ("KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Yuansheng Yang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
Yuansheng Yang
2026-11-13 06:28:55 +02:00
committed by Jarkko Sakkinen
parent 143fe16017
commit bab48a1044
+76 -24
View File
@@ -129,45 +129,77 @@ static int keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_par
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
down_read(&params->key->sem);
if (!params->key->type->asym_query) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_up_key_sem;
}
ret = params->key->type->asym_query(params, &info);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
goto out_up_key_sem;
switch (op) {
case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
if (uparams.in_len > info.max_dec_size ||
uparams.out_len > info.max_enc_size)
return -EINVAL;
uparams.out_len > info.max_enc_size) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_up_key_sem;
}
params->out_len = info.max_enc_size;
break;
case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
if (uparams.in_len > info.max_enc_size ||
uparams.out_len > info.max_dec_size)
return -EINVAL;
uparams.out_len > info.max_dec_size) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_up_key_sem;
}
params->out_len = info.max_dec_size;
break;
case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
if (uparams.in_len > info.max_data_size ||
uparams.out_len > info.max_sig_size)
return -EINVAL;
uparams.out_len > info.max_sig_size) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_up_key_sem;
}
params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
break;
case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
if (uparams.in_len > info.max_data_size ||
uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size)
return -EINVAL;
uparams.in2_len > info.max_sig_size) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out_up_key_sem;
}
params->out_len = info.max_sig_size;
break;
default:
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_up_key_sem;
}
params->in_len = uparams.in_len;
return 0;
switch (op) {
case KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY:
if (!params->key->type->asym_verify_signature)
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
case KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT:
case KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN:
if (!params->key->type->asym_eds_op)
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
}
out_up_key_sem:
up_read(&params->key->sem);
return ret;
}
/*
@@ -185,7 +217,16 @@ long keyctl_pkey_query(key_serial_t id,
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
down_read(&params.key->sem);
if (!params.key->type->asym_query) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_up_key_sem;
}
ret = params.key->type->asym_query(&params, &res);
out_up_key_sem:
up_read(&params.key->sem);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
@@ -230,10 +271,6 @@ long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
if (ret < 0)
goto error_params;
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!params.key->type->asym_eds_op)
goto error_params;
switch (op) {
case KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT:
params.op = kernel_pkey_encrypt;
@@ -260,7 +297,16 @@ long keyctl_pkey_e_d_s(int op,
if (!out)
goto error_in;
down_read(&params.key->sem);
if (!params.key->type->asym_eds_op) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_up_key_sem;
}
ret = params.key->type->asym_eds_op(&params, in, out);
out_up_key_sem:
up_read(&params.key->sem);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_out;
@@ -305,31 +351,37 @@ long keyctl_pkey_verify(const struct keyctl_pkey_params __user *_params,
ret = keyctl_pkey_params_get_2(_params, _info, KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY,
&params);
if (ret < 0)
goto error_params;
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!params.key->type->asym_verify_signature)
goto error_params;
goto out_free_params;
in = memdup_user(_in, params.in_len);
if (IS_ERR(in)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(in);
goto error_params;
goto out_free_params;
}
in2 = memdup_user(_in2, params.in2_len);
if (IS_ERR(in2)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(in2);
goto error_in;
goto out_free_in;
}
params.op = kernel_pkey_verify;
down_read(&params.key->sem);
if (!params.key->type->asym_verify_signature) {
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto out_up_key_sem;
}
ret = params.key->type->asym_verify_signature(&params, in, in2);
out_up_key_sem:
up_read(&params.key->sem);
kfree(in2);
error_in:
out_free_in:
kfree(in);
error_params:
out_free_params:
keyctl_pkey_params_free(&params);
return ret;
}